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Introduction 1
For Italian households the last quarter of a century is unprecedented in post-war history. Reflecting a dramatic slowdown of the country's economy, households' real incomes virtually ceased to grow, jeopardising the standards of living achieved (Ciocca 2007; Brandolini and Vecchi 2013) . The concern for widening inequalities and a shrinking middle class, which is common to many rich countries, must be seen in Italy within the peculiar, and worrying, context of a prolonged stagnation of households' real incomes. This consideration brings us to adopt a 1 We are indebted to Riccardo De Bonis, Giulia Lucarelli, Brian Nolan and Gianni Toniolo for very useful remarks on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank for comments participants at the book-project workshop "Inequality and Inclusive Growth" (Nuffield College, Oxford, 10-11 November 2016) and at the conference to celebrate Istat's 90th Anniversary, "La società italiana e le grandi crisi economiche 1929 -2016 " (Sapienza University, Rome, 25-26 November 2016 . The views expressed herein are solely ours; in particular, they do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy or the Eurosystem.
Forthcoming in Inequality and Inclusive Growth in Rich Countries: Shared Challenges and Contrasting Fortunes,
edited by Brian Nolan, Oxford University Press, 2018.
2 While the first recession was mostly driven by external factors originating in the world trade collapse in 2008, the second downturn was mainly caused by internal factors connected with a worsening of financing conditions and the deteriorating situation of the public finances (Caivano, Rodano and Siviero 2011; Busetti and Cova 2013) . 3 Between 1995 and 2015, per capita gross disposable income of the household sector (including non-profit institutions serving households), deflated by the price index of the final consumption expenditure, fell by 6 per cent in Italy, while it rose by 19 per cent in Germany, 23 per cent in France, 36 per cent in the United Kingdom, and 40 per cent or more in Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the United States. In Japan real incomes grew by just 3 per cent, but only in Greece did they drop by more than in Italy by almost 8 per cent. The historical data on GDP per capita are drawn from Baffigi (2013) , Tab_03 in the excel file; the data for the period 1995-2015 are drawn from Eurostat (2017) and OECD (2017a).
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"macroeconomic perspective" in our analysis of the evolution of the Italian income distribution. We relate distributive indicators to the three business-cycle phases just highlighted: the currency crisis of the early 1990s, the subsequent moderate growth, and the double recession. 4 We start by sketching the dynamics of aggregate household incomes based on our own reconstruction of time series from National Accounts (Section 2). After describing data sources and definitions (Section 3), we move to discuss how income distribution changed between 1989 and 2014 (Section 4), paying special attention to the evolution of income-based social stratification (Section 5). We then review the impact on income distribution of demographic forces, social security reforms, and labour-market developments (Section 6) and compare distributive changes between the two economic downturns considered here (Section 7). We draw the main conclusions in Section 8.
The aggregate dynamics of household incomes
Until the early 1990s, real gross household disposable income (GHDI) rose steadily, in line with GDP and household consumption expenditure (Figure 1 ). After the currency crisis, GHDI virtually stopped growing, while consumption kept rising in line with GDP.
This decoupling of consumption and GHDI dynamics was accompanied by a significant contraction of the propensity to save, from (then) high levels by international standards. It partly reflected lower convenience to save due to falling interest rates and easier access to borrowing, but it was also facilitated by the gains accrued on capital account on households' wealth holdings, especially its housing component. In 2007, before the global financial crisis, per capita real GHDI barely surpassed the levels of the early 1990s, while per capita real consumption had grown by almost 20 per cent. The double recession had severe repercussions: per capita real GHDI fell by nearly 14 percentage points between 2007 and 2014 and in 2016 was still at the levels of the late 1980s. This time consumption followed suit, despite a further compression of the savings rate. 5 While variations in asset prices had previously generated capital gains that had offset in part the poor dynamics of incomes, during the double recession they led to considerable capital losses that could account for a reduction in annual consumption by up to half a percentage point (Brandolini 2014, 238) . See Guiso, Paiella and Visco (2006) and Bassanetti and Zollino (2010) for estimates of the impact of changes in asset prices on the consumption behaviour of Italian households.
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The double recession took a heavy toll on households' incomes, but a largely predictable one in the face of the huge output collapse. As seen, however, the malaise of Italian households begins earlier, going back to the early 1990s. Indeed, the 1992 currency crisis is the watershed for GHDI dynamics even more than it is for GDP. While intrinsically linked with a deep political and institutional crisis, its origins can be traced back to the acute imbalances of Italy's public finances, characterised by net borrowing in excess of 10 per cent and a debt as large as the annual GDP. This fuelled fears that Italy could not meet the stringent commitments taken with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht on 7 February 1992 without relying on high inflation or traumatic fiscal adjustment measures (Signorini and Visco 1997; Rossi 2007 ).
The fiscal consolidation that followed is the first factor behind the widening gap between GDP and GHDI. As summarised by Balassone et al. (2002, 786) : "The looming financial crisis forced the government to take unprecedented corrective actions, which for 1992 included one-off levies on bank and post office deposits and on real estate. The 1993 budget represented a turning point in Italian fiscal policy. In order to curb the deficit expected for 1993, expenditure cuts and revenue increases amounting to nearly 6 per cent of GDP were implemented. Structural measures were also adopted to attenuate the expansionary trends in the major expenditure items". According to Miniaci and Weber (1999) , these corrective measures represented a major negative permanent shock, affecting particularly the younger cohorts, which can account for large part of the downfall in consumption and output.
Fiscal consolidation continued in subsequent years in order to comply with the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, although with varying intensity. It also led to a fall in bond yields which compressed the expenditure on debt-servicing, thus shifting resources from households, whose financial portfolios were mostly comprised of such assets, to the general government sector (Figure 2 ).
The second factor affecting the difference in GDP and GHDI trends can be found in the labour-market reforms implemented since the mid-1990s to curb nominal price dynamics and stimulate competitiveness (Brandolini et al. 2007; Sestito and Viviano2018) . 6 These reforms helped to sustain employment growth, especially its female component, and curtail 8 unemployment rates, while keeping wages in check amidst a gradually shrinking working-age population.
In 1961 While the share of employed persons in the total population kept falling until the mid1990s but then recovered quickly, real compensation per employee slowed down markedly.
Real earnings increased by a mere 2 per cent from 1992 to 2016, after having risen by over 2 per cent annually between 1970 and 1992. Overall, this implied a fall in the share of incomes from labour (including self-employment) in total value-added, or a shift of resources from households to the corporate sector.
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In brief, the contribution of labour incomes to GHDI has gradually weakened over time, mostly as a result of the slowing down in real earnings (Figure 4 The SHIW income definition is broadly comparable to that used for GHDI in National
Accounts, but there is less than complete alignment between the two sources, owing to methodological differences and the typical survey underestimation due to non response and underreporting biases (Baffigi, Cannari and D'Alessio 2016) . Without carrying out any adjustments to increase comparability, the SHIW income estimates are on average about two thirds of the National Accounts aggregates. The patterns differ at the beginning of the period, but are qualitatively similar since 1998 ( Figure 5 , panel A). Over the whole period, per capita real income rises slightly according to the SHIW whereas it declines according to National 10 Accounts. Mean equivalent income per individual better tracks per capita GHDI than per capita mean income.
In the identification of socio-demographic groups, we focus on households' rather than individuals' characteristics. The socio-demographic characteristics of the head of household, taken to be the highest income earner, are applied to all members in a household.
This choice is motivated by the assumption that it is the top earner who defines the socioeconomic status of the household as well as the household's position in the life cycle. Thus the distribution of equivalent incomes by age class must be understood as referring to the age of the household's top earner, not to the actual age of each individual. The young group therefore comprises all independent households headed by a young person, whereas young people still living with their parents are mostly counted in older age classes. Results would differ by making a different choice (e.g. Brandolini and D'Alessio 2011).
The household income distribution from 1989 to 2014
It is common practice to concentrate on the distribution of equivalent household income among individuals because it better captures the distribution of individual well-being by accounting for age differences in needs and economies of scales in consumption (e.g. in heating). However, if family formation is seen as a choice which is reflected in the well-being of family members, "... it might be argued that the benefits of having children are such that in a country where birth control is widespread no allowance should be made for the cost of children" (Atkinson 1983, 51) . Leaving aside this normative consideration, the distribution of (unadjusted) household income among households is of interest because it reveals how the purchasing power is spread among the different decision units, the households, regardless of their size and composition. While the equivalent household income is an analytical construct, the unadjusted household income is directly observable by people and may be closer to their perception of the distribution of economic resources. 
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To single out the factors underlying this widening gap, let y i , f(s i ) and w i be income, the number of equivalent adults according to equivalence scale f, and sample weight of household i of size s, respectively, and let r i =s i /f(s i ) be the ratio of household size to number of equivalent adults. By using the definition of covariance, the ratio between the mean equivalent income across individuals y e and the mean (unadjusted) household income across households y f equals y e /y f =(r*/s*)[1+ρ(y i ,r i )(σ y /y f )(σ r /r*)], where r* and s* are the averages of r i and s i , and ρ and σ denote the cross-sectional correlation and standard deviation.
Demographic patterns, such as shrinking household size and ageing, show up in the first term, the ratio r*/s*. Abstracting from household heterogeneity, this term is negatively correlated with household size and age. The number of equivalent adults falls less than household size, the more so if the fall is due to a lower number of children, who are assigned a smaller weight. The term capturing the correlation between household income and the ratio of size to equivalent adults may reflect long-term trends in labour market. For example, holding household structure constant, increased labour-market participation of adults other than the breadwinner implies a higher correlation and increased income dispersion, thus leading to a widening gap between equivalent and household incomes. Panel B of Figure 5 shows how the household structure r*/n* and the heterogeneity and correlation factor [1+ρ(y i ,r i )(σ y /y f )(σ r /r*)] contributed to the widening gap between equivalent and household incomes. While both factors contributed, the former was by far the major driver.
Household incomes are more unequally distributed among households than equivalent incomes are among individuals, reflecting the positive correlation between household size and income. 11 Their respective Gini coefficients follow similar patterns: they both increased sharply during the currency crisis, but they did not change much in the following two decades, including the years of the double recession ( Figure 6 ). 12 If anything, the index for household incomes showed a descending trend since mid-1990s. In 2014 the Gini coefficient for equivalent incomes was at the same level as in 1993, but 3.4 percentage points more than in 1989 (Table 1) . These tendencies are confirmed by examination of the whole equivalent income distribution (Table 2) .
To illustrate the changes in the distribution of equivalent incomes during the three distinct macroeconomic phases discussed earlier, in Figure To sum up, during the period 1989-2014 the fall of mean equivalent income per individual was less pronounced than that of mean household income per household, essentially as a consequence of a steady reduction in household size. This suggests a less rosy picture if no adjustment is made for economies of scale in consumption. The inequality pattern is, however, rather similar for both measures: a sharp increase in the early 1990s was followed by oscillations of the Gini coefficient without no clear trend, though the total rise in inequality is somewhat lower for household incomes than for equivalent incomes.
Macroeconomic phases and income-based social stratification
These patterns can also be examined by taking an income-based definition of social class. 13 We divide the population into four classes: low-income class (with equivalent income below 60 per cent of the median), lower-middle class (60-120 per cent of the median), uppermiddle class (120-300 per cent of the median), and the rich (above 300 per cent of the median).
13 Relying on income alone misses many critical aspects of the concept of social class (Atkinson and Brandolini 2013) . In particular, the income-based notion deviates from the standard approach in sociology which defines social class on the basis of individuals' position in the labour market. Several studies decompose income inequality trends in Italy by looking at social classes identified from the occupational status of the head of household. They find that the modest variation of summary inequality statistics in Italy since the mid-1990s hides a significant horizontal redistribution, which before the double recession favoured the households of the self-employed relative to those of production workers (Boeri and Brandolini 2004; Quintano, Castellano and Regoli 2009; Albertini 2013 ).
13
The shares in population and equivalent income for each class are reported in Table 3 
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The main distributional change took place during the early 1990s recession, and mostly took the form of a shift from the lower-middle class to the low-income class. After that, the population and income shares of different classes hardly changed, despite macroeconomic developments. 15 In particular, since the mid-1990s there is no evidence of a gradually shrinking middle class (identified by using income alone), a recurrent concern in the recent public debate in Italy.
14 There are many reasons why estimates on top incomes are not comparable with the SHIW estimates, including the fact that they refer to pre-tax revenues liable to the progressive personal income tax, hence excluding interest and other incomes on financial assets. For top income estimates see Alvaredo and Pisano (2010) and updates available at wid.world. 15 The same conclusion for the shorter period 1987-1998 was reached by Pittau and Zelli (2004) by conducting a non-parametric analysis of the distribution of real incomes in Italy. See also Pittau and Zelli (2006) .
Demographic forces and labour market developments
The summary measures of inequality and class stratification discussed so far fail to reveal some deep changes that reshaped the distribution of income among Italians. 16 Two sets of forces drove the transformation: on one side, population ageing interacted with a neverending process of reform of social security; on the other side, an employment growth dominated by the spreading of flexible contracts combined with stagnating real wages. These forces brought about a reallocation of resources along age/cohort lines. Changes in the distribution of wealth and its returns possibly played a role too, but the assessment of this channel is limited by the lower quality of available data.
Between the late 1980s and mid-2010s, ageing and a wave of pension reforms added about 3.5 million pensioners to the population. The currency crisis of the early 1990s started a process of reform of social security which aimed at curbing expenditure growth and correcting labour-market and redistributive distortions generated by the existing system (Franco 2002) . Before the new National Defined Contribution scheme was finally approved in 1995, many chose early retirement to take advantage of the more generous existing rules:
between 1991 and 1995 the average effective age of retirement fell from 61.9 to 59.6 years for men and from 59.1 to 57.4 for women. 17 The effective retirement age went up afterwards, to above 61 years in 2014 for both sexes, but very slowly, as a consequence of the extremely gradual phasing-in of the reforms. At the same time, the newly retired persons benefitted from better treatments than earlier cohorts, as "the increase in the age and contributory records at retirement for old-age and seniority pensions increased the average amount paid to new pensioners" (Franco, Marino and Tommasino 2008, 152) .
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Over the same period, concerted (consumer) wage moderation and a wave of labourmarket reforms, sometimes complemented by contractual agreements, contributed to raise the number of labour-income earners (including the self-employed) by 2.7 million persons.
However, in the wake of the augmented flexibility of the labour market, fixed-term contracts accounted for a substantial part of employment growth, and a progressive decrease in real 16 See Pittau and Zelli (2004; (Rosolia 2010; Ballarino et al. 2014; Cappellari and Leonardi 2016) . 19 This led to a worsening of the situation of young people in the labour market that "was due less to shrinking occupational chances … than to declining earning levels and increasing uncertainty about career prospects" (Giorgi et al. 2011, 144) . These developments helped to close the gap between pensioners' and workers' households: equivalent income grew from about 15,000 euros (at 2014 prices) in 1989 to just over 20,000 euros in 2008 for the former group, while it remained on average around 20,000 euros throughout the period for the latter group ( Figure 9 ). The fall during the double recession was more pronounced for workers' than pensioners' households.
This implied a substantial change in the composition of each fifth of the equivalent income distribution (Figure 10 ). The number of pensioners in the top two fifths increased by 3.3 million persons, while that of labour-income earners by only 300,000; on the contrary, in the two bottom fifths an increase in the number of labour-income earners by 1.5 million persons was accompanied by a decline in the number of pensioners by 350,000 persons. Not surprisingly, from late 1980s to early 2010s labour-income developments were the main factor compressing equivalent income growth across the whole distribution, with stronger drags exerted in the bottom and top fifths ( Figure 12 ). As pensioners gradually 19 Studies based on the joint analysis of expenditure and income distribution find that the variance of permanent shocks has not changed significantly, while the variance of transitory income shocks has increased, largely because of the rise in earnings instability (Rosati 2003; Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010). climbed up the equivalent income distribution, pensions restrained income growth in the bottom fifth but increasingly boosted it in the higher fifths. Property incomes provided a larger contribution to income growth for the middle 60 per cent; property income of Italian households reflect to a large extent developments in the real-estate market through imputed rents on owner-occupied housing, the largest wealth component for most Italian households.
Inequality in downturns: a comparison of two recessions
The macroeconomic perspective adopted in this paper brought us to single out two drop in the ratio by around 11 percentage points. For a given group, the changes in these decile-to-median ratios can be plotted against their initial value. Points in the north-east quadrant indicate that the group-specific deciles were above the overall median to start with and, over the period, moved farther away from the overall median. On the contrary, points in the south-west quadrant indicate that the group-deciles were below the overall median at the beginning of the period and fell further below it over time; points in the two other quadrants indicate a convergence towards the median during the period. Visually, an upward (downward) sloping sequence of points means that the group-specific distribution became more (less) unequal over time, whereas a flat sequence suggests that the relative positions did not change; the position of the curve in the space informs instead on the position of the group relative to the overall median. During that period inequality increased within each socio-demographic group under consideration. Among low-educated households, this happened because the bottom half of the distribution lost ground, both relative to the overall median and relative to the upper end of the distribution, whose position relative to the overall median did not change significantly.
On the contrary, three quarters of high-educated households had already equivalent incomes above the overall median in 1989-91, but moved further away from it, the more so the higher the decile. At the end of the 1980s more than 60 per cent of retirees' households had an equivalent income below the overall median; by 1993-95, those between the 3rd and 6th deciles had partly closed the gap, and those in the upper deciles had moved even farther. The distribution of equivalent incomes among workers' households spread out around the median very much in line with the overall median. Among young households, the bottom four deciles fell back, while the top three deciles moved relatively upward among old households. Income distribution became more unequal both within the Centre-North and the South. The comparison by country of birth (Italy vs. abroad) is not significant because of the small sample size of the foreign population, and it is reported only for the sake of completeness.
The generalised increase in within-group inequality went along with an opening up of differences along education levels, age groups, professional status, and geographical area of residence. To sum up, the increase in inequality was pervasive, both within and between sociodemographic lines, during the early 1990s recession. On the contrary, within-group inequality increased only among old households and, to a much lesser extent, households living in the South during the double recession. One striking feature of this downturn is the widening age 19 divide. Even the early 1990s recession hit young households relatively more than old households, but the latter's median equivalent incomes were then well below those of the former. There is, however, a second salient feature: the concentration of income losses among the immigrant (resident) population. While the age divide has received considerable attention, the suffering of households of foreign-born heads has gone largely unnoticed.
Conclusions
The currency Second, the post-1993 apparent stasis of summary indices of distribution, including measures of income-defined social stratification, should not deflect our attention from the fact that significant changes were experienced by socio-demographic groups. This emerges neatly by comparing the two recessions. During the 1992 currency crisis the inequality increase was pervasive, within and between socio-demographic groups. During the double recession, inequality rose among the elderly but not much within other groups. As to between-groups differences, two changes stand out: the widening gap between the young and 20 the elderly; the fact that the worsening in living conditions was borne wholly by households of foreign-born heads.
Third, the previous conclusions relate to the relative position of people along the income distribution. There is a need to account for the level of real incomes, the more so when their aggregate dynamics languish. In particular, patterns differed between the early 1990s recession and the recent double recession. While "pseudo-absolute" poverty (i.e.
estimated with respect to a threshold fixed in real terms) increased by the same amount in both episodes, this stemmed mainly from rising inequality in the former but a general impoverishment in the latter. Thus, during the double recession the middle-income class suffered a loss in purchasing power, but not in size.
The economic debate in advanced economies is increasingly concerned with widening inequalities and a disappearing middle class. Italy is no exception. However, the general perception about these phenomena in Italy appears to be at odds with the observed virtual stability of (synthetic) distributive measures -a point already made more than a decade ago by Boeri and Brandolini (2004) . This dissonance likely hinges on the long-lasting poor dynamics of incomes. Stagnation is even more evident when incomes are measured by unadjusted-per-household values, which are directly observable, unlike the abstract equivalent incomes per individual. Moreover, the more pronounced impoverishment of workers versus retirees, of young cohorts relative to old ones might have further fostered the sentiment of a regression of new generations' future prospects.
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The analysis in this paper reminds us the importance of focusing on the working of the productive system and the labour market to address inequalities in Italy. Creating the conditions for more and better-paid jobs is the difficult task for policymakers. The weakness of the Italian social safety net is well known as is its limited effectiveness in public redistribution for reducing market-income inequality (e.g. Immervoll et al. 2006) . Amending the flaws of the tax-and-benefit system is important to achieve "inclusive growth", but improving the household living conditions requires, first and foremost, restoring growth. Source: Authors' elaborations on data from the Bank of Italy, SHIW-HA (Version 9.1). Source: Authors' elaborations on data from the Bank of Italy, SHIW-HA (Version 9.1). Source: Authors' elaborations on data from Bank of Italy, SHIW-HA (Version 9.1). Source: Authors' elaborations on data from Istat, National Accounts (1973 , 1991 , 1997 , 2017a and Pagliano and Rossi (1992) . Note: GDP, GHDI and consumption expenditure are indices (1992=1) of per capita values at constant prices (left-hand axis); the saving rate is the ratio of total savings to GHDI (righthand axis). Households include Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households. The time series are adjusted for breaks in National Accounts (1970, 1980, 1990, 1995) . Source: Authors' elaborations on data from Istat, National Accounts (1991 , 1997 , 2017a and Pagliano and Rossi (1992) . Note: All variables are divided by real GDP (own deflator) in 1992: thus, the series for real National disposable income (consumption deflator) shows how this aggregate evolved between 1970 and 2016, after being rescaled by the value of real GDP in 1992. The series for the disposable income of Households, Public administration, Financial institutions, and Nonfinancial institutions are divided by the consumption deflator and add up to the real National disposable income. Households include Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households. The time series are adjusted for breaks in National Accounts (1970, 1980, 1990, 1995) . Source: Authors' elaborations on data from Istat, National Accounts (1973 , 1991 , 1997 , 2017a and Pagliano and Rossi (1992) . Note: Households include Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households. The time series are adjusted for breaks in National Accounts (1970, 1980, 1990, 1995) . Source: Authors' elaborations on data from Bank of Italy, SHIW-HA (Version 9.1).
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